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1. SUMMARY: Appellants challenge the Illinois statute that provides 
that in intestate succession, an illegitimate child is an heir of his mother but 
- - - 7 
is not an heir of his father unless his parents subsequently inter.marry and he 
is acknowledged by the father, They argue that the statute is an invidious dis-
crimination both against and among .illegitimate children, and is an invidious 
discrimination on the basis of sex. 
~(Z ~ o.._ 
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2. FACTS: Jessie Trimble and Sherman Gordon (unmarried) lived 
together with their child, Deta Mona Trimble, from 1970 until Gordon's death 
(intestate) in 1974. In 1973, the Circuit Court of Cook County had entered an 
order finding Gordon to be the father of Deta Mona and ordering him to pay 
support. Gordon paid the support and in his day-to-day activities publicly 
acknowledged Deta Mona as his child. 
Illinois law on intestate succession provides in pertinent part (Ill. Rev. 
Stat. Ch. 3, Sec. 12, final paragraph): 
An illegitimate child is heir of his mother and of any 
maternal ancestor, and of any person from whom his mother 
might have inherited, if living; and the .lawful issue of an 
illegitimate person shall represent such person and take, by 
descent, any estate which the parent would have taken, if 
living. A child who was illegitimate whose parents i ~ rmarry 
and who is acknowled by the father as the father's child is 
legitimate. 
After Gordon's death, Deta Mona, by her mother and next friend, 
? 
Jessie Trimble,filed a Petition for Letters of Administration, Determination 
of Heirship, and Declaratory Relief in the Circuit Court of Cook County, 
Illinois. Appellants argued the unconstitutionality of the statute. The court 
upheld the statute, ruling that Deta Mona was not the heir at law of Gordon 
and that appellee s (Gordon's father, mother, et al. ) were his heirs. 
The Illinois Supreme Court allowed direct appeal, and allowed 
appellants to file an amicus brief in In Re Estate of Louis Karas, a similar 
case then pending before the court. In Karas, the court upheld the statute 
..-....... ---against claims of unconstitutional discrimination on the basis of illegitimacy 
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in reported form and attached as App. C to the petn). The court subsequently 
affirmed the instant case by order, relying on Karas. Our Clerk's Offic e 
informs me that no notice of appeal or petition for cert. has been filed in 
Karas. 
) 
this Court ' s decision in Labine v." 1 Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971), upholding a Louisiana law precluding illegitimate 
In ruling on the 11 illegitimacy11 claim, the court in Karas relied on 
children from inheriting on an equal basis with legitimate children. The 
Illinois court applied a "rational basis" test, 61 Ill. 2d at 51. Reflecting con-
cerns mentioned in Labine, it held explicitly that the state had an interest in 
pr~ve~tip.g _spurious claims against an estate, . id., at 52, and implicitly that 
the state had an interest in encouraging family relationships and establishing 
a method of property disposition, id. , at 48, and it noted that there was no 
"insurmountable barrier" to inheritance by an illegitimate child because the 
decedent could have made a will. The court examined the several pre- and 
post- Labine cases in this Court that might be read to limit Labine, and ruled 
that Labine remained the controlling precedent in this case. 
The court also rejected the claim that the statute imposed unconstitu-
tional sex discrimination because surviving mothers did not receive the indirect -
benefits (inheritance by the children) received by surviving fathers. The Court 
found nothing in the Probate Act that indicated an intention to alleviate the bur-
1\ls" 
dens on a surviving parent. The cou~tlh~ld that the law did not discriminate 
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3. CONTENTIONS: As background, appellants argue that the 
Louisiana statute upheld in Labine was unique in that it divides illegitimate 
children into two classes, "natural children" who must be acknowledged and 
whose parents must have been capable of marrying at the time of their 
conception, and "bastards," who are defined as all unacknowledged illegiti-
mate children and those whose parents were incapable of contracting 
marriage at the time of their conception. "Bastards" are barred from 
inheriting from either parent, while "natural children" inherit from their 
mother if she leaves no other descendants and from their father if he leaves 
no other heirs-at-law. Louisiana also specifically provides for support 
payments for all illegitimate minor children from either parent and from 
the estate of either parent, even where the parent dies intestate. Appellants 
argue that Illinois (and twenty-one other states), by contrast, not only dis-
criminates against illegitimate children, but also discriminates among illegiti-
mate children by creating sub-classes based on the sex of the surviving parent, 
and forbidding inheritance from the father whether or not he formally acknowl-
edged them, supported them, or had been judicially determined to be their 
father. In addition, Illinois provides no scheme for support of an illegitimate 
child from the estate of a deceased father. 
A. The "Illegitimacy" Claim. 
1 ) Appellants contend that the scrutiny to be applied under Labine is 
very unclear and must be clarified. For example, it has been noted that Labine 
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distribution of th e property of inte s tate d e cede nts is immune from attac k 
on equal prote ction grounds," Eskra v. Morton, 524 F. 2d 9 (CA 7 1975) 
(Tuttle, Cummings, Stevens) (r e jecting that reading and distinguishing 
Labine on other grounds). See generally Labine, 401 U.S., at 538-39. 
None th e l e ss, cases before and after Labine can be read as n1andating s tan-
dards of scrutiny in "illegitimacy" cases all along what e v e r "spectrum" of 
equal protection analysis exists . See Levy v. Louisia n a , 391 U.S. 68 (19 6 8); 
Glona v. American Guara ntee & Liability Insurance Co., 391 U.S. 73 (19 68 ); 
@ Aetna Casua lt:r & Suret:r Co., 406 U.S. 164 (1972); Gome z v. Pere z , 
409 U . S. 535 (1973); New Jersey Welfare Rights Organi zation v. Cahill, 411 
*' U.S. 619 (1973); Jime ne z v. Weinberg er, 417 U.S. 628 (1974).- App e lla nts, 
as might be expe cted, argue for a "strict scrutiny" or a "fair and -substantia l 
relation" test. 
2} Assuming that Labine did not rende r state succession statute s 
imn1une from "rational relation" scrutiny, appellants proceed to argue that 
the rationales asserte d to justify the statu t e s in Labine and in the insta nt c a se 
h#.llt 
~---s be e n und e rcut by post-Labine cases. 
First, the interest in "preserving family life" is asserted to h a ve 
been undercut by the comments in New Jers e y Welfare Rights, 411 U.S., at 62 :~, 
Web e r, 406U.S . atl75-76, and Jime n e z, 417U.S., at 632, that"pe na li z i n g 
-1../ Appe lla nts crnpha si z e that Jim e n ez struck down the use in fe d e r a l 
social security determinations of the very Illinois statute at issue here. S ee 
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the illegitimate child is an ineffectual -- as well as well as an unjust -- way 
of deterring the parent." Cf. also, Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645. 
(of pa.TCf"l\,T~) 
Second, the 11 difficult3of proof")_ argument is asserted to have been 
undercut by the statement in Gomez, 409 U.S. at 538, that such difficulties 
may not "be made into an impenetrable barrier that works to shield 
otherwise invidious discrimination." See also Jimenez, 417 U.S. at 636. 
Finally, the possible validating factor that there was no "insurmountable 
barrier" to providing for the illegitimate child (i.e., a will could have been 
executed) is asserted to have been undercut by the comment in Weber that 
the illegitimate child cannot be penalized for the action or inaction of his or her 
parent, ·· 406 ·u.s. at 175-76. Cf. Reedv. R.eed, ·404 : ti:s. 71 (1971) in 
which the statutory preference to the male in issuing letters of administration 
of a person dying intestate could easily have been altered by the writing 
of a will by the decedent. 
The Illinois court did not regard the Illinois statute as justified 
as embodying the "presumed "intent" of the decedent, and appellants do 
not consider the validity of such a justification. That rationale was considered 
and ·rejected, however, in Eskra v. Morton, 524 F. 2d at 13-14, wherein the 
court held that the possibility that "there are a significant number of private 
citizens who would intentionally punish children for the transgressions of 
their parents'' is not an acceptable basis for the government to adopt a law 
discriminating against illegitimate children. 
B. The "Sex Discrimination" Claim. 
In Karas two types of sex discrimination were claimed. Both claims 





The first" sex discrimination" claim raised was that the child, although 
not discriminated against because of his or her sex, is directly injured 
because of sex discrimination between his or her parents (i.e. sex discrimin-
ation deprives the child of the right to inherit from the father. Cf. 
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636). The opinion in Karas states 
that this was raised as a state constitutional claim by the petitioner in 
Karas, 60 Ill. 2d at 54, but) by distinguishing carefully between that argument 
and the arguments of the amicus in Karas (appellant here), the court :implied 
Id. at 55, that appellant here did not raise such a claim on either state or 
federal grounds, but rather relied on the injury to the mother (see infra). 
The Jurisdictional Statement in the instant case does not discuss any 
sex discrimination fa1jury to the child except insofar as it is encompassed 
in the claim of invidious discrimination among illegitimates, presented he re 
as an "illegitimacy" claim, and I would therefore suggest that the 
"sex discrimination" claim, as such, has not been raised. ' 
The claim made by amicus in Karas (appellants here) was that 
surviving mothers are discriminated against because although both fathers 
and mothers have a duty to support the illegitimate child, only the surviving 
father gets the benefit (in the form of alleviation of that support) of the 
child's inheritance from the intestate deceased parent. Assuming that 
this claim was raised on federal constitutional grounds (there is nothing rn 
the papers to indicate one way or the other), it would seem that the claim 
could be raised only by the injured party, to wit the mother. In the instant 
case, however, it appears that the mother is not a party except as "next 








discrimination. Assuming that the mother is a party, there might be 
a question whether she has standing to assert the failure of the 
state to award the child part of the father's estate. Cf. Linda R. S. v. 
Richard D., 410 U.S. 614; Association of Data Processing Service 
Organi zations v. Camp, 397 U.S. l 50j 60 Ill. 2d at 55- 56. 
4. DISCUSSION: At least insofar as presented in the Jurisdictional 
Statement, there is not a substantial federal issue of direct sex discrimination, 
: e 
because the only claim asser~ is of injury to the mother, who does not appear 
to be a party in her own right. In addition, it does not appear that the claim 
was raised on federal constitutional grounds (a response or the record might 
clear up these questions) . 
As to the question of illegitimacy, however, there do seem to be 
some substantial issues. Appellants' distinction of the Labine statute on 
the grounds that it does not distinguish among illegitimates is not altogether 
convincing. Under Louisiana law, "natural children" can inherit from the 
mother if she leaves no descendants, but from the father only if he leave s no 
heirs-at-law. The opinion in Labine made no mention as to rights of inheritance 
against the mother, an omission that might be used by either side in the 
instant case (i.e._, either the Court believed that rights or different rights 
against the mother were irrelevant, or it simply assume d that the rights were 
equal against both parties). Nevertheless, the Court in Labine did not explicitly 
addr e ss the issue of discrimination amonS:_illegitimates, and insofar as the 
Illinois scheme reduces to a discrimination only against the illegitimate 
offspring of intestate decedent fathers, the " non-discrimination" as to illegitimafr 








is appropriate) of the Illinois statute. Cf. Stanley v. Illinois, 405 U.S. 645. 
In addition, Labine itself may have been substantially undercut by the 
later decisions discussed above. 
On the general use of illegitimacy as part of a qualification scheme, 
the vote in Mathews v. Lucas, No. 75-88, indicates that such use is proper 
in certain circumstances. It is not clear, however, whether Lucas will 
resolve the question whether Labine established some test lower than 
"rational relation11 for judging state control of succession. 
Narrowing the issue in this case to the constitutionality of a state 
law of intestate succession under which an illegitimate child may take from his 
mother ·but ~ot (except in special circumstances) ·frorri 'liis father, the 
cases necessarily turn on the reasons offered by the states, but nevertheless 
there appears to be a split between, on the one hand, this case and Watts 
v. Veneman, 334 F. Supp. 482, 484 and n. 1 (D. D. C. 1971 ), aff 1d in relevant 
part and reversed in part, 476 F. 2d 529 (D. C. Cir. 1973), and, on the other 
hand, Green v. Woodward, 40 Ohio App. 2d 101, 318 N. E. 2d 397 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1974); with Eskra v. Morton, 524 F. 2d 9 (CA 7 1975) taking what might 
be called a middle ground of holding that Labine does not control where the 
discrimination is directed against the illegitimate I s relationship to his or her 
mother. 
Although this case involves a state probate statute and the statute is 
more troublesome than the statute in Mathews v. Lucas in that it does not 
take cognizance of the facts that paternity has been judicially determined and 
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the case nonetheless may be a hold for Lucas. To the extent, however, 
that state probate laws are distinguishable from state "benefits" 
laws, Lucas may shed little light on the instant case. 
In any event, a request for a motion to dismiss or affirm might be 
most helpful. 
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GORDON, et al. 
-
Motion of Appellee King for 
Leave to Proceed Further 




SUMMARY: On March 22, the Court noted probable jurisdiction to consider 
a challenge to the Ill. statute which provides that, in intestate succession, an 
illegitimate child is an heir of his mother, but not of his father, unless his parents 
subsequently intermarry and he is acknowledged by his father. This is the motion 
of appellee Ethel Mae King for leave to proceed in forma pauperis. 
In her affidavit, appellee King avers that her sole income is derived from 
her employment as a clerk by the Circ. Ct. of Cook Co., Ill. ($119. 06 weekly nPt ). 
- - - - __...J ,,,,_,. ---
She resides with her husband and minor son. Appellee's husband, who is not a 
party to this suit, has executed an affidavit in which he avers that his sole income 
is a net weekly salary of $190. 00 and that he is frequently hospitalized due to a 







- - 2 - -tion. Appellee King recites her fixed monthly expenses and lists as her sole 
asset a savings account with a current balance of $300. 00 [Appellee and her 
husband apparently own a twice -mortgaged home and an automobile.] 
It appears that, if the Court should affirm, appellee' s recovery would 
amount to $343. 40 and that she is being represented by counsel at no expe nse to 
her. 
DISCUSSION: The Court has granted appellants' ~motion. 
There are 5 named appellees- -appellee King's divorced husband whom she 
has not seen in over 20 years and her 3 adult children. She avers that, in her 
opinion, none of the other appellees are financially able to help pay costs and that 





J .To: Mr. Justice Brrnman 
Mr. Jus tice S;, :1.rt 
Mr. Jus-~i ~o \~ 1 i -'c 1 
Mr. Jus t l.d0 ~ Lt'J 1 '·Ll 
Mr. Just ice Bl/ :JY 
Mr. Justice ... ). i· l 
Mr. J";-;t;,~o £ ,_' Jt 
Mr. J1...:1t.1ce Stev.:.lcl 
From: The C:i~f Justice 
APR 2 ~ 1976 
Circulated: ____ _ 
Recirculated: _____ _ 
Re: 75 - 5952 - Trimble v. Gordon 
MR. CHIEF JUSTICE BURGER, dissenting. 
Appellee Ethel Mae King has filed a motion for leave to proceed 
in forma pauperis accompanied by her affidavit and an affidavit executed 
lJ 
by her spouse with whom she resides. Appellee states that she cannot 
afford the cost o f printing the brief for appellees in this matter because 
her expenses consume her income and hence asks that the government 
pay the printing costs. 
According to the affidavits accompanying this motion, appellee 
King and her spouse are both gainfully employed. Appellee and her spouse 
receive a weekly net income of $119.06 and $190.00 respectively; their 
aggregate annual net income amounts to $16,071.12. Mr. King claims 
that he is required to spend $100. 00 each month for medication and 
accepting that as true, nevertheless appellee and her spouse are still left 
with a net annual income of approximately $15,000. Without more, this 
J_/ 
Appellee King's spouse is not a party to this suit. 
J • • 
- 2 -
income would appear to disqualify appellee from the relief as a pauper 
which the Court today grants, unless we are to abandon all standards 
hitherto deemed appropriate in according the privilege of in forma pauperis 
treatment in cases involving indig ent parties. Accordingly, I dissent 
from the Court's order allowing appellee to proceed in forma pauperis. 
In concluding as I do that the cost of printing appellees 1 brief is 
not beyond the means of appellee King, I also note that briefs prepared 
'!:._/ 
for the use of this Court "need not have been imprinted on- a press. 11 
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Snider v. All State Administrators, Inc., et al., 414 U.S. 685, 6 
686 (1974). See also, Rule 39( 4). 
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CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMU N April 22, 1976 
Re: No. 7 5- 5952 - Trimble v . Gordon 
D ea r Chief: 
Please join me in your propos e d dissent from the granting 
of the appe llee 1s motion. 
Sincerely, 
j~ 
The Chief Justice 
c c: The Conference 
- -.f;u.pr.rmt <!jourt of tl1r }1nilrtl ,§tltlr.s 
tTu.slru1gftrit, lJ. C!j . ~1\SJ!-2 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . REHNQU IST 
April 22, 1976 
Re: No . 75 - 5952 - Trimble v . Gordon 
Dear Chi e f: 
Please join me in your diss enting opinion in this 





The Chief Justice 
Copies to the Conference 
.,. -

















From: l(r. Justice Stevens 
Circulated: Y \ ).... ).._ ) 1 ~ 
Recirculated:------
MR. JUSTICE STEVENS , concurring . 
In my judgment it is appropriate to permit Mrs . King 
t o proceed in forma pauperis for these reasons. 
The controversy is over a share in a decedent 's estate 
consisting of a used car ; Mrs . King 's interest in that estate 
has a value of $343.40. Her adversary is represented by 
experienc e d and talented counsel employed by the Legal 
Assistance Foundation of Chicago. The issue p resented by 
the appeal is substantial . It is important t o the Court and 
to the public that both side s be wel l r epresented . 
As I read the appel l ee ' s affidavit, the burden of 
res isting the appea l will impose a substantial hardship upon 
h e r and her husband . Her weekly income is $119.06, and , 
whi le employe d , her husband earns $190.0 0 per week . However, 
he has been hospitalized 18 time s for a hear t condition in 
the pa s t six years ; on each such occasion he spent three t o 
four weeks in the hospital , f ollowe d by an additional conva-
lescence at home . He received no income during those periods 
and manifestly the risk of a reoccurrence remains . 
In view of these circumstances , the danger that Mrs. King 
will decide that her minimal interest in the outcome of the 
litigation is outwe ighed by the need to conserve funds to care 
>· No . 75-5~ - 2 --
for her husband is not to be ignored . More importantly , 
even if she remains willing and able to shoulder the 
burdens of the litigation , the public interest in having 
the case well presented justifies the subsidy of the 
small cost involved . Sometimes the burden of litigation 
falls more heavily on per s ons of modest means than those 
who are destitute . 
- ~ ttprtutt (!Jettrl of ilt~ 1ltn-iu~ ·i'f 
~l:Ullyhtgfott. ;!0 . QJ. 20.;r)!, 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE H ARRY A . BLACKMUN A7 2, 1976 
Re : No . 7 5- 5952 - Trim ble v. Gordon 
D ear Chief: 
Ple ase join me in your p r opos e d di ssent from the granting 
of the a ppe lle e's 1notion. 
Sincerel y , 
j~ 
The Chief Justice 






I will be happy to join your dissent 
omit the last paragraph. 
As too many unprinted briefs of marginal 
legibility already are being filed, I do not want to 
encourage typewritten or other means of reproduction 
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No. 75-5952 Trimble v. Gordon 
This is a brief memorandum to indicate to the clerk 
assigned to this case my areas of interest. 
In a case not before us In re Estate of Louis Karas, 
) 
61 Ill. 2d 40 (1975), the validity of the Illinois intestacy 
statute with respect to illegitimate children was sustained. 
The question was whether the illegitimate child of a man who 
~ 
died intestate may, by statute, denied inheritance rights 
I\ 
available to all legitimate children. Viewing Labine v. Vincent, 
401 U.S. 532 as controlling, the Illinois court sustained the 
statute. 
The present case, presenting a similar (though more 
extensive)challenge to the Illinois statute, was decided by 
the Illinois Supreme Court without an opinion and on the 
authority of Karas. The case is here on appeal. 
Appellant, Jessie Trimble, had lived - out of wedlock -
with Sherman Gordon for a number of years. They had a daughter, 
Deta Mona, who was about three years old at the time her father 
was a homocide victim. He left an estate of $2,500, leaving no 
lawful spouse and only one child, Deta Mona, whom he publicly 
acknowledged as his child and supported pursuant to a paternity 
order for support. 
This case arose when the mother, as mother and next friend, 
filed a petition (a probate proceedings) in the Circuit Court 
of Cook County, seeking appointment as administrator. Thi s 
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effect that the only lawful heirs / under Illinois law/ of the 
deceased lwere his father, mother, brother and sisters. Deta 
Mona was not included as an heir in view of the provisions 
to the contrary of§ 12 of the Illinois Probate Act. That 
secti on declares that illegitimate children are heirs of 
their mothers but not of their fathers, thus providing that a 
child's intestate succession rights depend on (i) the marital 
status of his parents at the time of his birth, or (ii) on 
the sex of the deceased parent. 
Appellant challenges this statute as creating a classification 
offensive to the equal protection clause. 
In Labine this Court, 5 to 4 , sustained a Louisiana statute 
quite similar to the Illinois statute. Appellant argues 
variously that Labine can be distinguished, that the rationale 
of Labine has been rejected by subsequent cases, and that -
in any event - Labine should be overruled. 
Appellant further argues that illegitimate children 
bear all of the essential characteristics of other "suspect 
classes", and therefore strict judicial scrutiny of the 
classification is required. But even under the rational 
basis standard, appellants make a rather persuasive argument 
that the classification is irrational and furthers no 
substantial legitimate state interest. 
Appellant apparently introduces into the case for the 
~,... 
first time a "sex discrimination"/\ It is said that§ 12 
invidiously discriminates against women in that the effect 
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obligations to the child (since the child may inherit from the 
mother), while denying similar assistance to the surviving 
mother. 
I am inclined to think the arguments advanced on behalf 
of appellant are quite persuasive. I would like for my clerk 
to consider: 
1. Labine. Whether there is a principled way to 
distinguish Labine? If not, the extent to which subsequent 
decisions (Weber, Griffiths, Sugarman, etc.) have eroded the 
rationale of Labine? 
2. Standard. I wrote Weber without holding that 
illegitimates constitute a "suspect class", and I prefer not 
to enlarge the categories already established by the Court. 
If I conclude to vote with appellants, can I support my 
position on the basis of a Weber-type analysis? Weber was 
construed at the time as a "middle tier" analysis. I prefer 
not to create a third tier and thereby add to the existing 
confusion. On the other hand, as my rejected draft of Murgia 
(last Term) indicates, I would give more substance to the 
rational basis standard than some of my Brothers. 
3. Sex classification. Appellees argue (p. 31 their 
brief) that the sex classification issue is not properly before 
us. What about this? If the issue is here, does it have 
substance? 




Justice Powell No. 75-5952 Trimble v. Gordon 
- BOBTAIL BENCH MEMO 
The attached memo discusses the issues you raised for 
' 
consideration in your aid to memory memorandum. I have not 
yet finished the section on allegeddll•k sex discrimination, 
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I. The Relevance of Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 (1971). 
The first area that you identified for consideration 
concerned the relevance of Labine--specifically, you were interested 
in my views on whether Labine could be distinguished. I think 
it is difficult to come up with a principled distinction of 
Labine. Bt Ii,, gn both its facts and the nature of the statutory 
-=-
scheme, Labine was quite similar to the instant case. In Labine, 
the~ parents of the illegitimate child had authorized an 
official state form acknowledging that the illegitimate child 
was the child of the father, Ezra Vincent . Ezra Vincent died 
intestate. Under the La. statutory scheme, illegitimate children 
who are never acknowledged have no right to take property by 
intestate succession from their father's estate. In most · 
instances, the father and mother could not even bequeath property 
to them by will. Illegitimate children acknowledged by their 
fathers are "natural children," and they can take from their 
fathers by intestate succession, but only to the exclusion of the 
state. They could also receive property from the estate by 
bequest, but only up to a stated maximum percentage. Children 
born out of wedlock but legitimated or adopted could take in the 
same manner as any other child. 
The Court, 5-4, alllli: sustained this statutory scheme 
~ 
against an equal protection challenge. My reading of the 
opinion ~indicates that a number of factors were considered 
relevant. First, the Court noted that the statutory scheme 
established many distinctions: for example, it discriminated 
~ V e.V\ I\ ~ I'\ I Do ,Jo~ 0,,,, J w"':J.~ 
J 
f m~r-.,~ Ck-. ~-
- • ~ 
- in• favor of wives and against concubines. According to the 
Court, the social difference between a wife and a concubine is 
-
-
~analogous~o the difference between a legitimate and an illegitimate 
child. "One set of relationships is socially sanctioned, 
legally recognized, and gives rise to various rights and duties." 
401 U.S . at 538 . The Court concluded that the state had the 
oower to al• accomplish these discrimination~ with respect 
to the distribution of property left within the state. 
And the Court emphasized a second factor--that the state 
had not created an insurmountable barrier to the illegitimate 
child. The lillf _., father could have left property to the child 
via a will [since the child had been acknowledged], he could have 
legitimated the child, or he could have stated in his acknowledgment 
~ - -
of paternity that he desired to legitimate the child. J& all 
of these circumstances, there was no equal protection violation. 
How then does the instant case compare with Labine. Here, 
as in Labine, the child has been acknowledged. Uere, as in 
1::._abine_, the child ... cannot take via intestate succession 
from the estate of the father. Here, as in Labine, there is no 
insurmountable barrier since there are the options of a will and,_-~ 
legitimating the child . There are two differences :""'"" Here, unlike ~ 
Labine, the illegitimate child can I I an take by intestate 
succession from the estate of the mother . This factor may have 
some value for appellants in establishing a sex discrimination 
claim, but with respect to the discrimination worked upon 
illegitimates it cuts against appellants when compared with the 
-
- • 
complete exclusion of Labine [i.e., they could 
not take from their mothers or their fathers]. The other 
difference cuts in favor of the appellants, but it is not a 
difference on which to hang a constitutional rule . Here, unlike 
~+di 
Labine, acknowledged illegitimate children cannot take f i Io 
._f>,<J 0 f( 0 s ~ J t-o_,only to the exclusion of the esta ti' and there is 
~ ~ J -
apparently no right here [in Illinois] as there was in Labine 
G) 
[in La.] for the child to proceed against the heirs if thef eLJ~ 
-
required the funds for their support. This is at best a minor w-._......._ 
distinction~ the statutory schemes. 
How then does one accomplish a principled distinction of 
Labine? It seems to me that you have to hit Labine where it 
really hurts: the statement that the social difference between 
a wife and a concubine is analogous to the social difference 
between a legitimate and an illegitimate child. It may be that 
the state has the power to say that the wife takes property and 
the concubine does not. It cannot be said that such a rule is 
illogical or unjust. And it can be said that such a · rule has 
some relationship to individual responsibility. But with respect 
to illegitimate children, the opposite is true. As you noted 
in Weber, imposing disabilities on the illegitimate child is 
contrary to the basic concept of our system that legal burdens 
should• bear some_,__ tMa'Zti!,i relationship to individual 
responsibility or wrongdoing. No child is responsible for his 
~ 
birth. Since this particu~ approach• would find support in 
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._,. cases have eroded the rationale of Labine . The major post-
Labine cases are Weber, 406 U. S. 164; Gomez, 409 U.S . 535; 
New Jersey Welfare Rts. Org., 411 U.S. 619; Jimenez, 417 U.S. 
628; and Lucas, 96 S. Ct. 2755. We can begin with Weber. - You authored the opinion in Weber, and it would be difficult to 
l f'A. M'l~O"',,~ 
argue that Weber played~ role in the erosion of Labine. This 
is because your opinion in Weber expressly distinguished Labine 
on the following grounds: it involved distribution of property 
at death, an area in which we have paid considerable deference 
to the rules of the states;'f~:O;d, the father in Labine could 
easily have modified the fact that the child would be excluded 
'1"J..e 
from a taking by drawing a will or legitimating l. child. In 
Weber, as you noted, it would have been impossible to acknowledge 
the child and thus make the child eligible for the compensation 
benefits at issue since the father's legal wife was still 
living [thus precluding acknowfegdgment as a matter of state 
law]. But there is a good deal of tension between the broad ------~~ - -
language in Weber and the continued vitality of Labine. You -
note in Weber that allowing illegitimate children to qualify -
for benefits would obviously not encourage people to have 
illegitimate children, and the same thing is true in the instant 
case. But one must also remember that the statute before the 
Court in Weber required in any event a showing of dependency, 
and your ory inion notes that this lessened the possible problem 
of determining uncertain claims of parenthood. 
Gomez was a brief P/C. The state statute at issue precluded 
y 
- - ({) 
- illegitimate children from qualifyinfg for parental support. 
-
-
The Court simply noted that it was "illogical and unjust" for 
a state to deny an "essential right" to illegitimate children 
parents were not married. The Court noted 
that there were lurking problems .C.~• with respect to 
~proof of paternity, but also stated that such problems could 
not be made an impenetrable barrier. 
New Jersey Welfare Rights was another brief P/C. There 
the Court simply noted that the benefits under the "Assistance 
to Families of the Working Poor Program" were as indipensable 
to illegitimate children as to legitimate children, and the state 
1--h, "11-.Q. bo r ~ -
could not deny llfeal, the benefit's (.consistent with the equal 
~protection clause. [Note that this rz r 1 would not 
be a situation involving problems of proof. These were 
family units, and the disqualification was that the parents 
were not married]. 
Jimenez invalidated a SSA rule that completely precluded 
illegitimate children from qualifying for benefits as the 
children of a dis ab led worker even if they PPS? , @Pd ,unilcil pz s Irv 
could prove that they were dependent on the diabled parent who 
Mire had a~knowledged them. The Court recognized the interest in 
preventing spurious claims, but held that the state could not 
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as really a response to Jimenez. In Lucas, certain 
presumption of dependency for the purpose 
of determining eligibility for certain SSA benefits. This 
group included legitimate children, adopted children, children 
entitled to take property as a matter of state intestacy law, 
a child whose parents went ►l g through a marriage 
ceremony involving a nonobvious defect, a child who had been 
acknowledged in writing, a child who was J it declared by a 
oourt to be a child of the parent; and a child as to whom the 
parent had been ordered to pay child support. Other illegitimate 
1 
--~ 
children ~~-to m~;. a showing of depe~dency. The Court~-
~ph J s d t\u ••~n? I· s upheld the statutory scheme, noting that ~~ ,~-
Congress's assumptions were not inconsistent or insubstantial -~ ' 
with respect to supporting the conclusion that individualized 
factual inquiry to isolate each nondependent child in a given 
class was unwarranted. 
~ -cZ. 
These cases bring --t_ to the following conclusio~ Outside 
the area of state intestacy laws, the Court has not been willing 
to tolerate excessive discrimination against illegitimate children. 
[This is true in the area of tort actions for wroll\gful death, 
workmen's compensation benefi2 ts, parental support, and complete 
exclusions from -=t- various aid programs]. The question is 
whether the Court should reexamine the situation with respect to 
state intestacy laws under Labine. U a Ii y :iii 




II. The Standard of Review. 
Before considering the merits of the equal protection 
challenge to the Illinois statute, I wanted to respond to 
~ 
G) 
your inquiries concerninglstandard of review. Given this Court's 
decision last Term in ~s, supra, I doubt anyone will be ,~ interested in using this case• as a vehicle to add to the 
categories of suspect classes or to add a third tier to the 
equal protection challenge for illegitimates. Lucas expressly 
rejected the suggestion that illegitimates should be considered 
as a suspect class, and clearly placed the standard of review 
within the normal equal protection framework. But the Court 
also suggested that there would be ealN review of the purported 
state justification for distinctions with respect to ilegitimates, 
exµressly noting that the Court had had "no difficulty" striking 
down arbitrary distinctions in this area, citing a number of 
the cases discussed above. 
It seems to me that appellants generally have a strong case 
for the contention that the Illinois scheme is an impremissible 
one. They are quit"e correct in their contention that the --instant ei1bb. distinction in treatment cannot be supported 
by a state interest in encouraging and promoting family relationships. 
Weber makes it quite clear that penalizing the child is an -
ineffectual approach to that goal . And as to the state interest -
in preventing spurious claims, the statute sweeps too broadly. ~ --- - ,.. As with the - e parental support statute at issue in Gomez, the 
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course it is true that the parent can take action to see that 
the illegitimate child takes property (will, legitimation). 
I 
But there is nothing the illegitimate child can do once the 
parent has passed away.) The father in this case had apparently 
l::Een adjudicated to 6 be the father of the child, and it seems 
~ .. +-
to me that l should suffice. It may be that the interest of the 
state in quick and definitive property distribution would 
justify a more narrow restriction. '8uli I 0011111 h ·tat But 
this restriction is way too broad. It makes no adjustment for 
fathers declared to be a father or fathers who openly acknowledge 
the child. 
An opinion reaching this result would have to come to 
grips with Labine. In that regard it seems to me that the 
Court should just say that subsequent cases have eroded the 
claimed "analogy" with a wife and a concubine. Moreover, the 
Court could note that the second factor relied on in Labine--
the absence of an insurmountable barrier--was actually related 
to the first. The Labine Court seems to have felt that if a 
father wanted his illegitimate children to take property he 
should affirmatively so indicate. But that is not true "Wlllt:b. 
with respect to his legitimate children, and the post-Labine 
cases have noted that intimacy among family members may be the 
same regardless of the legal status of the child. Thus, one 
could argue that the Labine view has not withstood the test of 
the subsequent cases. 
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CHAMBERS O F 
JUSTICE WM. J . BRENNA N. JR. 
f • .§upH11H' CT;lllltt lJf t!rl' Jtni.td) .§ibks 
J11nz; Iii11~tt11t, p. <!j. :2. t\GJi2 
December 10, 1976 
RE: No. 75- 5952 Tri mb le v. Gordo n 
Dear Chief : 
/ 
Lewis is wi lli ng to take the opinion in the above 
and I have therefore ass igned it to him . 
The Chief Justice 






.J USTICE W M . .J . BREN N AN , JR. 
.iu:pi-ttttt Q}iturl itf tqt ~ttlttb .ihtlts 
~aaqinghm. J. Q}. 2!lffeJ!.~ 
January 18, 1977 ✓ 
-~, 
w~e~1~ RE: No . 75-5952 Trimble v. Gordon 
Dear Lewis: 
The only suggestion I have / as I told you yesterday, is in 
note 14. Would you consider a /revision reading something like 
the following? ..,.,,... [ _ 
14 . We woul~ have a diffferent case if the statute were 
~ 
tailored o eliminate imprecise and unduly 
burden~ me avenu s of establishing paternity. ++ew--
~ n cases here accurate and efficient methods 
are available sue..,_s a prior state court adjudi =-- _ 
cation a form l acknowledgment ,ro~ i-nfol"flla--1 rbut 
r-e--1--:i-abJ e ev-4..dence -of- pa te-rn4 ty, the States ' leg it i mate 
interest in providing for the orderly disposition of 
property cannot justify unjust discriminations 
directed at illegitimate children. 
I suggest it because I am somewhat fearful that, as presently 
written, your clear distinction between adjudicated or formally-
acknowledged illegitimates on the one hand, and informally acknowl-
edged children on the other, may be read as an open invitation for 
Illinois to reformulate its intestate laws so as to exclude children 
who can only establish paternity informally, even if their evidence 
would not inflict undue burdens upon state proceedings (for example, 











CHAM B ERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
- -.§uprmu C!Jl!tlrl irf titr 'lilttfu~ ~taftg 
~rurJrngLm, Ia. QJ. 2!l~Jl., 
January 25, 1977 
Re: No. 75-5952, Trimble v. Gordon 
Dear Lewis, 
I should appreciate your adding the following 
at the foot of your opinion in this case. 
Mr. Justice Stewart dissents. Like 
the Supreme Court of Illinois, he finds 
this case constitutionally indistinguish-
able from Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 
572. He would, therefore affirm the 
judgment. 
Mr. Justice Powell 





j5uputttt <!Jourt of tq~ ~h j5faftg 
'lll~u;fringLttt. J. <!J. 2llp'!,~ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE THURGOOD MARSHALL January 25, 1977 
Re: No. 75-5952, Trimble v. Gordon 
Dear Lewis: 




Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
- -
~u:puuu (!Jltttrl ltf tlrt ~ttittb" ~bdts 
'JhurJrutghtn. ~- (!J. 2ll.;i'1$ 
C HAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE JOHN PAUL STEVENS 
January 25, 1977 
Re: 75-5952 - Trimble v. Gordon 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Mr. Justice Powell 





.iltp'f'tm:t (!J4tud 4tf tlrt ~tb ,ihttts 
,.aslpughm. ,. QJ. 2llffe'1-$ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE 
January 25, 1977 
Re: No. 75-5952 - Trimb.le v. Gordon 
Dear Lewis: 
Please join me. 
Sincerely, 
Ir-
Mr. Justice Powell 





,jttµt'tmt (!Jcud cf tfrt 'J!tttittb ,jtatta 
Jfaalrittghm. ~. <q. 2llffe'!' 
J USTICE W M. J. BRE NN A N . JR. January 25, 1977 





Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
/ 
-r.\ ~-'1  ,jnprtutt <!f o-m1 qf lltt ~tb ,jhdtg 
-ulpnghttt. ,. (Q:. 2llffe'1.;l 
C HAM BERS OF 
JUSTICE WILLIAM H . f..'IEHNQUIST 
January 25, 1977 
Re: No. 75-5952 - Trimble v. Gordon 
Dear Lewis: 
Would you include my name along with Potter's in 
the language at the foot of your opinion in this case 
which he describes in his letter of January 25th. I also 
anticipate writing a separate dissent, which I will try 
to put together with all deliberate speed. 
Sincerely : ~ 
y 
Mr. Justice Powell 
Copies to the Conference 
,-,:""' 7r~ - u,,L,-l 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE POTTER STEWART 
.inp:rtltu (!tltltti itf tlft ~b jlbdtg 
JfasJrhtghnt. ~. ~ 2llffe'1,, 
January 25, 1977 
Re: No. 75-5952, Trimble v. Gordon 
Dear Lewis, 
' 
I should appreciate your adding the following 
at the foot of your opinion in this case. 
Mr. Justice Stewart dissents. Like 
the Supreme Court of Illinois, he finds 
this case constitutionally indistinguish-
able from Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 
572. He would, therefore affirm the 
judgment. 
Mr. Justice Powell 





- -~mu (!tltltrl itf t!r~ ~ttlt:tb' ~taf.tg 
Jl'i:udfi:ttgf:tttt, ~. (!t. 2llffe~$ 
CHAMBERS OF 
JUSTICE HARRY A. BLACKMUN 
January 27, 1977 
I 
Re: No. 75-5952 - Trimble v. Gordon 
Dear Lewis: 
Will you please also include my name in Potter 1 s 




Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
~.?J /Lt _Llj.- - ~ G -j . j,uvumt <q:and af t!rt ',Jlttitta j,tattg 
~agfringhm. ~. (Q:. 2llffeJ!.$ 
CHAMBERS OF 
THE CHIEF JUSTICE 
March 14, 1 
Re: 75-5952 Trimble v. Gordo 
/ 
Dear Lewis: 
Please ~how me al dissent~£o. 






Mr. Justice Powell 
cc: The Conference 
- -
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~ttpTttttt <!to-ttrt of tltt 'Jffnifrh .§taft-g 
, ~asfrington, W, <!t• 211gr,1,_;l 
JUSTICE LEWIS F. POWELL, JR. May 3, 1977 
c:-JL E=" r- r- Py ~ -'> d ... 
PLEASE k£TURN '. 
' 
- e 
"" TO FIL£ · J 
MEMORANDUM TO THE CONFERENCE: 
Re: Cases Held for Trimble v. Gordon, 75-5952. 
(1) No. 75-1148 Lalli v. Lalli (Administratrix). 
New York allows an illegitimate child to inherit generally 
from its mother, but from its father only 
"if a court of competent jurisdiction has, during the 
lifetime of the father, made an order of filiation 
declaring paternity in a proceeding instituted during 
the pregnancy of the mother or within two years from 
the birth of the child." N.Y. Estates, Powers, and 
Trusts Law §4-l.2(a). 
Appellant is the natural but illegitimate son of Mario Lalli. 
He instituted this suit, seeking status as an intestate 
distributee of his father's estate. The N.Y. Ct. App. re-
jected his equal protection challenge to the statute despite 
the fact that his father had supported him financially and, 
incident to the requirement of parental consent to appellant's 
1969 marriage, had sworn in a notarized writing that appellant 
was his natural son. 
I believe that the notarized acknowledgement falls in 
the category of evidence of paternity that does not compromise 
the State's interests. Trimble v. Gordon, Slip Op., at 10 n.14. 
Accordingly, I will vote to vacate and remand in light of Trimble. 
* * * * 
(2) No. 75-1610 Pendleton v. Pendleton. 
Kentucky law provides that a "bastard shall 'inherit only 
from his mother's kindred," but "[i]f a man who has had a child 
by a woman afterward marries her, the child or its descendants, 
if recognized before or after marriage, shall be deemed legiti-
mate." Ky. Rev. Stat. §§391.090(2), (3) .. Appellant was born 
-. 
- 2 -
to "common law" marriage partners Bethel Rawlins and Cornelius 
Pendleton in 1956. Common law marriages are not valid in 
Kentucky, and their issues are illegitimate. In a bastardy 
proceeding brought in 1959 the Fayette County Court adjudged 
that Cornelius was appellant's father and directed that he 
support the child. Upon the death of appellant's father, an 
administrator was appointed and the estate distributed to 
persons other than appellant. 
The Ky. Sup. Ct. found procedural defects with certain of 
the counts in appellant's complaint, but the court rejected 
on the merits his effort to recover some of the real property 
distributed after his father's death. Although the court 
indicated that it was sympathetic to appellant's equal 
protection argument, it felt compelled by the authority of 
Labine to reject it. Although appellees argue that under 
state law appellant could not prevail even if his constitutional 
argument were accepted, the Ky. Sup. Ct.•s· opinion is to the · 
contrary. As this case is closely analogous to Trimble, I will 
vote to vacate and remand in light of Trimble. 
* * * * 
(3) No. 75-1079 Schanefelt v. Paradiso. 
Apart from the fact that it deals with an intestacy issue, 
this case has no relationship to Trimble v. Gordon. The 
relevant provision of New Me xico intestacy law provides as 
follows: 
"Inheritance by heirs of wife.--If heirs are not 
thus found the portion uninherited shall go to the 
heirs of the wife of the intestate, if dead, according 
to like rules, and if he has more than one wife, who 
died, it shall be equalled divided between the heirs 
of all such wives, taking by right of representation.'' 
53 N.M. Stat. Ann. §29-1-15. 
The intestate decedent in this case was female and left no 
heirs. She had been married, and her husband had pre-deceased 
her. Appellant is an heir of the husband and would be entitled 
to a share of the decedent's estat~ if the above provision also 
applied to inheritance by heirs of pre-deceased husbands as 
well as to pre-deceased wives. But the court held that although 
the provision was not symmetrical, it was constitutional. In 
► 
- 3 -
the J.S. appellant relies on Frontiero v. Richardson, 411 U.S. 
677 (1974). Appellee cites Labine v. Vincent, 401 U.S. 532 
(1971) for the proposition that substantial deference is 
appropriate to decisions of the state legislatures made with 
respect to the disposition of property at death. Appellee 
points to a number of provisions of New Mex ico community 
property and intestacy law that favor the heirs of one spouse 
or the other. Appellee also notes that the statute here has 
been amended to apply to the heirs of both spouse s, so that 
the effect of a victory would go only to appellant and thus not 
justify the Court's time. 
The view that this provision was irrational was apparently 
shared by the New Mexico legislature which amended the law 
shortly after this case was decided. There is discrimination 
against male intestates, apparently without a rational reason 
supporting the distinction. I will vote to vacate and remand 
in light of Califano v. Goldfarb, No. 75-699, (sex discrimination 
against males) and Trimble v. Gordon, (de ference to legislatures 
regarding disposition of property at death not absolute). If 
the case were here as a petition for certiorari, I would deny, 
but this is an appeal. 
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Page proof of syllabus as 
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NOTE: Where tt Is feasible, a syllabus (headnote) will be re-
leased, as Is being done In connection with this case, at the time 
the opinion is Issued. The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion 
of the Court but has been prepared by the Repo,rter of Decisions for 
the convenience of the reader. See United States v. Detroit Lumber 
Oo., 200 U.S. 321, 337. 
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Section 12 of the Illinois Probate Act, which allows illegitimate children 
to inherit by intestate succession only from their mothers (though 
under Illinois law legitimate children may inherit by intestate succes-
sion from both their mothers and their fathers), held to violate the 
Equal Protection Clause of t he Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 4-14. 
(a ) A classification based on illegit imacy such as that challenged 
here is not "suspect" so as to require that it survive "strict scrutiny," 
Mathews v. Lucas, 427 U. S. - (1976) . Nevertheless, this Court 
requires, "at a minimum, that a statutory classificat ion bear some 
rational relationship to a legit imate state purpose," Weber v. Aetna 
Casualty & Surety Co ., 406 U. S. 164, 172, and the Court's previous 
decisions in this area show t hat the standard is "not a toothless one." 
Mathews v. Lucas, supra, at -. P. 5. 
(b) Section 12 cannot be justified on the ground that it promotes 
legit imate family relationships. A State may not attempt to influence 
the actions of men and women by imposing sanctions on the children 
born of their illegit imate relationships. Pp. 6-8. 
( c) Difficulties of proving paternity in some situations do not justify 
the total statutory disinlrnritance of illegitimate children whose fathers 
die intestate. Section 12 is not "carefully tuned to alternative con-
siderations," Mathews v. Lucas, supra, at - , as is illustrat ed by the 
fact that in the instant case the decedent had been determined to be 
the appellant child's father in a state-court paternity action. Pp. 
8-10. 
( d) The fact that appellant 's father could have provided for her 
by making a will does not save § 12 from invalidity under the Equal 
Protection Clause. Pp. 11-12. 
( e) Though appellees contend that § 12 should be sustained on the 
theory that it represents the legislature's attempt to mirror the intent 
of Illinois decedents, the Illinois Supreme Court in construing the law 
I 
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did not rely upon a theory of presumed intent, and this Court's own 
examination of the statutory provision discloses no such legislative 
intent; rather, as the State Supreme Court indicated, § 12's primary 
purpose was to provide a system of intestate succession more just to 
illegitimate children than the previous law, tempered by the secondary 
interest in protecting against spurious paternity claims. Pp. 12-14. 
Reversed and remanded. 
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At issue is the validity of a provision of the Illinois 
A 
Probate Act which allows illegitimate children to inherit/ 
by intestate successionl4rom thei.r mother✓but not from 
their fathers. Legitimate children, however, may inherit 
from both their mothers and fathers. 
This suit was instituted by a mother on behalf of her 
1i -A.tt J... illegitimate child. Nt'Jt! sal.y a&& he father "supported the 
C94•-'-
child .aad openly acknowledged her a g ais eki•e , 112 also 
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had been found to be her father/in a paternity order issued 
by an Illinois court. He had not, however, married the 
mother/ or legally adopted the child. 
He died without a will, and this suit challenged the 
validity - on equal protection grounds - of the ~~Rew 
statute that prevented the child from inheriting. 
The Illinois Supreme Court sustained the validity 
of the statute, relying primarily on the decision of this 
Court in Labine v. Vincent (1971). 
For reasons stated in an opinion filed today with 
the Clerk,we reverse the judgment of the Illinois Supreme 
~. 
